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Is Europe to Benefit from 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative?
 
by Nicola Casarini
ABSTRACT
With the One Belt One Road (OBOR), arguably Beijing’s major 
diplomatic outreach in decades, a process towards greater Sino-
European connectivity has been put in place. The implementation of 
the OBOR in Europe has focused so far on financing infrastructure 
projects, in particular railways in Southeast Europe and ports in 
the Mediterranean Sea. This has been complemented by growing 
monetary linkages between the People’s Bank of China and 
European central banks through the establishment of currency 
swap agreements and yuan bank clearing – so-called “offshore 
renminbi hubs” – with the aim of lowering transaction costs of 
Chinese investment and bolstering the use of the Chinese currency. 
While there are undoubtedly great economic opportunities, China’s 
OBOR initiative also presents the EU with a major political challenge. 
There is the risk, in fact, that a scramble for Chinese money could 
further divide EU member states and make it difficult for Brussels to 
fashion a common position vis-à-vis Beijing. Furthermore, China’s 
economic penetration into Europe may lead – if not properly 
managed – to a populist backlash as well as a strain in relations with 
Washington. All these elements should be taken into consideration 
by EU policymakers, as China’s OBOR makes inroads into the Old 
Continent.
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Is Europe to Benefit from China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative?
by Nicola Casarini*
1. China’s Belt and Road meets Juncker’s Fund
The One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative – unveiled by President Xi Jinping in 
late 2013 – is China’s major diplomatic outreach in decades. The project combines 
a land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and a sea-based 21st Century Maritime Silk 
Road which connects China to Europe through South East Asia, Central Asia and 
the Middle East, covering areas generating 55 percent of the world’s GNP, 70 percent 
of the global population, and 75 percent of known energy reserves. The stated aim 
of this grandiose project is to boost connectivity and commerce between China 
and 65 countries traversed by the OBOR. China’s total financial commitment to 
the project is expected to reach 1.4 trillion dollars. Beijing has already committed 
around 300 billion dollars for infrastructural loans and trade financing in the 
coming years, a sum which includes a 40 billion dollar contribution to the “Silk 
Road Fund” for infrastructural development and the 50 billion dollar initial capital 
(to be raised eventually to 100 billion dollars) allocated to the China-initiated Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).1
Sitting at the end-point of the OBOR, Europe stands to benefit greatly from these 
funds. At the last EU-China Summit on 29 June 2015, Jean-Claude Juncker, the 
European Commission President, called for the creation of synergies between 
his European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) and China’s Belt and Road 
initiative.2 Premier Li Keqiang replied to Juncker by making a multibillion dollar 
1 For more details on the One Belt, One Road strategy, see François Godement and Agatha Kratz 
(eds.), “‘One Belt, One Road’: China’s great leap outward”, in ECFR China Analysis, June 2015, http://
www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/one_belt_one_road_chinas_great_leap_outward3055. See 
also Zhao Minghao, “China’s New Silk Road Initiative”, in IAI Working Papers, No. 15|37 (October 
2015), http://www.iai.it/en/node/5495.
2 EU-China summit joint statement, 29 June 2015, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/
press-releases/2015/06/29-eu-china-statement.
* Nicola Casarini is Senior Fellow for East Asia at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and a non-
resident Global Fellow at the Wilson Center in Washington.
. Paper prepared for the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), October 2015.
IA
I 
W
O
R
K
IN
G
 P
A
P
E
R
S
 1
5
 |
 4
0
 -
 O
C
T
O
B
E
R
 2
0
15
3
©
 2
0
15
 I
A
I
Is Europe to Benefit from China’s Belt and Road Initiative?
IS
S
N
 2
2
8
0
-4
3
3
1 
| I
S
B
N
 9
78
-8
8
-9
8
6
5
0
-6
4
-4
investment commitment to the EFSI, though no precise amount has been unveiled 
so far.3
Totalling 315 billion euros, Juncker’s plan aims at relaunching Europe’s growth 
and job creation in sectors ranging from innovation to research, education, and 
transport infrastructure. The Belt and Road initiative, on the other hand, serves 
the purpose of reviving the Chinese economy, now at a historical juncture 
transitioning from export-oriented growth to a new model based on consumption 
and outward investment. Loans for infrastructure projects abroad are expected to 
contribute to upgrading the Chinese economy at a time of domestic overcapacity 
and to the restructuring of various sectors, including heavy industries involved in 
the building and maintenance of transportation and energy infrastructure. Trade 
financing would serve to maintain existing – as well as find new – markets for 
Chinese products.
Policymakers in Brussels and Beijing are currently identifying appropriate 
cooperation mechanisms between Xi’s Belt and Road and Juncker’s Fund. Ideas 
presented so far include the establishment of a China-EU joint investment fund to 
support project shareholding, joint contracting and co-financing.4 Infrastructure 
projects in Southeast Europe and the Mediterranean are likely to become the first 
concrete examples of this enhanced Sino-European connectivity.
2. Focus on Southeast Europe and the Mediterranean
Southeast Europe and the Mediterranean – in particular the Greek ports – have been 
the main beneficiaries of the Silk Road funds so far. The flagship infrastructural 
project in the area is a land-sea express route which will directly link the port of 
Piraeus – one of the largest container ports in Europe for which Chinese shipping 
giant COSCO has a 35-year concession – with at least six to eight Central and Eastern 
European countries, thus turning the Piraeus into a Chinese hub for trade with 
Europe. The 2.2 billion euro project is financed by soft loans from China’s Export-
Import Bank, and will be built by the state-owned China Railway and Construction 
Corporation. Work on the line is scheduled to begin by the end of 2015, and should 
be completed by 2017.5
3 Translated keynote speech by H.E. Li Keqiang at the 10th EU-China Business Summit, 29 June 
2015, http://www.eu-china-business-summit.eu/content/uploads/2015/07/CHN-BS-sp290615-
Translated-speech-of-H.E.-Premier-Li-Keqiang.pdf. See also Robin Emmott and Paul Taylor, 
“Exclusive: China to extend economic diplomacy to EU infrastructure fund”, in Reuters, 15 June 
2015, http://reut.rs/1IX7LPK.
4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Li Keqiang Meets with Vice 
President Jyrki Katainen of the European Commission, 29 September 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.
cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1304115.shtml.
5 Dragan Pavlićević, “China’s Railway Diplomacy in the Balkans”, in China Brief, Vol. 14, No. 20 
(October 2014), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42992.
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The 370 km railway between Belgrade and Budapest will significantly improve 
transport of passengers and goods, cutting travel time between the two capitals 
from eight hours to less than three. China is also committed to upgrading Greece’s 
railway system, focusing on the northern route to Macedonia through Thessaloniki 
and the Macedonian railway line that would connect Greek lines to the upgraded 
north-south route in Serbia and the Hungaro-Serbian High-Speed Railway.6 
Concurrent with these investments in the Greek and Macedonian portions of the 
line are Chinese plans to upgrade both railway and road infrastructure from Bar 
through Montenegro to the Serbian border. Once all the projects are completed, 
the high-speed rail connection will extend all the way from Piraeus to Budapest. A 
double track between the Mediterranean and the Danube will thus enable trains to 
reach a speed of up to 200 km per hour. By reducing shipping times, the new line 
will make Chinese products more competitive in the European market, helping to 
offset rising production costs at home.
Chinese goods are currently shipped through the Suez Canal, then in a wide loop 
through the Mediterranean, the Bay of Biscay and the English Channel to ports 
on Europe’s north-western coast, including Rotterdam, Antwerp and Hamburg, 
from where they are dispatched by road and rail to inland cities. Once the Balkan 
projects are completed, Chinese products will go from the Suez Canal – which 
recently doubled its capacity – directly to Piraeus to be loaded onto trains, cutting 
transit times from roughly 30 to 20 days.
Piraeus is central in Beijing’s strategy of linking China with Europe through the 
Mediterranean. The Greek port is, in fact, the gateway between the Middle East and 
the Balkans and European markets; from a Chinese perspective, it is a unique entry 
point into the EU. When Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang visited Piraeus in June 
2014, he called it “the pearl port” of the Mediterranean Sea.7
Chinese companies are already well established in Piraeus. Huawei, an electronics 
conglomerate, opened a logistics centre in the port two years ago. This was followed 
by the June 2014 signing of a 2 billion euro deal between Greece and China to build 
new container ships and bulk carriers, financed by the China Development Bank, 
to serve the Greek port. However, the most important Chinese company operating 
in Piraeus is COSCO.8
6 For more information on Chinese railways projects in the Balkans see: Dragan Pavlićević, “China, 
the EU and One Belt, One Road Strategy”, in China Brief, Vol. 15, No. 15 (July 2015), http://www.
jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=44235.
7 Xing Zhigang, “Li charms dock workers in Greece”, in China Daily, 20 June 2015, http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/world/2014livisitbritaingreece/2014-06/21/content_17605748.htm.
8 Frans-Paul van der Putten, “Chinese Investment in the Port of Piraeus, Greece: The Relevance for 
the EU and the Netherlands”, in Clingendael Reports, 14 February 2014, http://www.clingendael.nl/
node/5439.
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In 2009, COSCO – a state-owned, Hong Kong-listed company that is China’s 
biggest dry bulk carrier and liner carrier – obtained a 35-year concession from the 
Greek government to operate two container terminals at the Piraeus Port. The deal, 
which carried a nominal value of 4.3 billion euros for the whole period, required 
COSCO to make substantial investments in Terminal II and to build a new section 
of Terminal III. In September 2013, COSCO agreed to invest an extra 230 million 
euros to increase capacity, prompting then Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras 
to call the Piraeus Container Terminal project the most important investment in 
Greece in the past decade.9
COSCO has upgraded the port’s outdated crane system and built a new deep-water 
dock capable of accommodating today’s giant container ships. This overhaul has 
made Piraeus one of the world’s fastest growing ports, as it handled 3.7 million TEU 
(20-foot equivalent units, the standard measurement of container shipments) in 
2014, more than nine times the 433,000 TEU received in 2008, before COSCO made 
its investment.
The Chinese carrier plans to double Piraeus’s container traffic next year if it wins 
the privatisation tender to operate the rest of the port. COSCO is in pole position to 
snap up the 67.7 percent of the port that is still controlled by the Greek government, 
a stake that will soon be put up for sale according to the terms of Greece’s latest 86 
billion euro bailout agreement with the International Monetary Fund, the European 
Commission and the European Central Bank. If COSCO succeeds, Piraeus could 
become as big a container port as Hamburg, Rotterdam or Antwerp.
Chinese shipping companies also have a well-established presence in the Italian 
ports of Naples and Genoa, where both COSCO and the China Shipping Company 
have invested heavily. It is worthy of note that the port of Gioia Tauro in southern 
Italy also received some interest from Chinese investors before they decided to 
turn their focus on Piraeus.10
By focusing on infrastructure projects on land and sea, China seeks to build better 
connectivity as well as acquire political influence in the areas interested by the 
Belt and Road. The OBOR represents a great opportunity for the Old Continent – 
in particular for some cash-strapped governments of the periphery – to obtain 
financial capital from Beijing.
9 COSCO, The Inauguration of the Expansion of Pier III of PCT Successfully Convened, 23 January 
2015, http://en.cosco.com/art/2015/1/23/art_773_68531.html.
10 Marco Sanfilippo, “Chinese Investments in Italy: Facing Risks and Grasping Opportunities”, in 
IAI Working Papers, No. 14|19 (December 2014), p. 19-20, http://www.iai.it/en/node/2375.
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3. Taking Europe by investment
All European governments are eager to attract Chinese investment – and Beijing 
does not appear to be disappointing them. By Summer 2015, China had made 
purchases for about 65 billion dollars in listed companies on European stock 
markets,11 ranking fourth for size of investment, surpassing Japan. In addition to 
Germany, which remains China’s top destination, Beijing is now showing great 
interest in Eastern and Southern Europe.12
Since early 2014, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) – through its investment arm, 
the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) – has invested more than 3.5 
billion euros on stakes of about 2 percent each in ten of Italy’s largest companies: 
these include Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Unicredit, Saipem, Mediobanca, Fiat 
Chrysler Automobiles, Telecom Italia, Prysmian, Assicurazioni Generali, ENEL and 
the state-controlled ENI (oil and gas operator). This has made the PBOC the 10th 
largest investor in Italy’s stock exchange. Moreover, in May 2014 the Shanghai 
Electric Group bought a 40 percent stake in power engineering company Ansaldo 
Energia for 400 million euros. This was quickly followed by China’s State Grid’s 
acquisition of a 35 percent stake in energy grid holding company CDP Reti for 2.1 
billion euros.13 In March 2015, China National Chemical Corp (ChemChina) bought 
a majority stake (16.89 percent) in Pirelli, the world’s fifth largest tire maker, in a deal 
worth 7 billion euros.14 Beijing has, so far, invested more than 6.5 billion euros in 
listed companies on the Italian stock market, a sum which corresponds to around 
10 percent of total Chinese investments in European stocks.
China has also increased its involvement in project financing. Here also, it is the 
countries of Eastern and Southern Europe that have received most of the funds so far. 
At the Third Meeting of Heads of State and Government of China and the 16 Central 
and Eastern European countries (CEECs) held in Belgrade in mid-December 2014, 
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang pledged to inject more funds to boost infrastructure 
11 This sum represents a conservative estimate, based on a number of reports published in the first 
part of the year and some recent investment announcements published in the specialised press in 
the last months. See, for instance, Baker & McKenzie, Chinese investment into Europe hits record 
high in 2014, 11 February 2015, http://www.bakermckenzie.com/news/Chinese-investment-into-
Europe-hits-record-high-in-2014-02-11-2015; Thilo Hanemann and Mikko Huotari, Chinese FDI in 
Europe and Germany: Preparing for a New Era of Chinese Capital, A Report by the Mercator Institute 
for China Studies and Rhodium Group, June 2015, http://rhg.com/?p=8832.
12 Nicola Casarini, “China’s Rebalancing towards Europe”, in The International Spectator, Vol. 50, 
No. 3 (September 2015), p. 122-129.
13 For more details on Chinese deals in Italy and their value, see Marco Mutinelli, “The central 
bank is targeting listed companies”, in Il Sole 24ore, 22 September 2015, http://24o.it/LKAcmz; 
KPMG, Merger & Acquisitions 2014, April 2015, http://www.kpmg.com/IT/it/IssuesAndInsights/
ArticlesPublications/Pagine/RapportoMA.aspx.
14 See Fausta Chiesa, “Alleanze: cinesi e italiani, parte la caccia alle buone occasioni”, in Il Corriere 
della Sera (CorrierEconomia), 5 October 2015, p. 16, http://confindustria.toscana.waypress.eu/
RassegnaStampa/LetturaNL.aspx?dest=info@assindustria.lu.it&cod=052015SIM148610001.
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and sea and land connections between China and the region,15 in addition to the 
69 cooperation projects between China and the CEECs already pledged after the 
second meeting in Romania in November 2013.16
4. China’s monetary inroads
In parallel with the surge in Chinese investment, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) 
has fostered closer monetary links with European central banks. This has occurred 
mainly through currency swap agreements and the establishment of yuan bank 
clearing – so-called “offshore renminbi hubs.” In October 2013, for instance, the 
PBOC and the European Central Bank (ECB) signed a bilateral currency swap 
agreement for a sum of 45 billion euros (RMB 350 billion), the largest ever signed 
by Beijing outside the region.17
Most of Europe’s central banks have added – or are considering adding – the Chinese 
currency to their portfolio, often at the expense of the dollar, as growing trade ties 
and a growing number of reforms by Beijing are leading reserve managers to view 
it as a viable reserve currency.18 In October 2014, for instance, the United Kingdom 
raised 3 billion yuan via a landmark offshore sovereign yuan bond and kept the 
proceeds in its foreign exchange reserves rather than converting them into dollars. 
According to the specialised press, in November 2014 the ECB discussed whether 
to add the Chinese yuan to its foreign currency reserves.19
The purpose of this strategy is three-fold: (i) anchoring market confidence in 
Beijing’s reform commitment; (ii) bolstering the international use of the renminbi; 
(iii) strengthening the chances of the renminbi to be included in the IMF Special 
Drawing Rights (SDR) basket in the near future. As the One Belt, One Road initiative 
moves forward, it is becoming increasingly urgent for Beijing to increase the 
renminbi’s share in trade financing, monetary transactions and foreign exchange 
reserves in order to facilitate Chinese outbound investment and lower transaction 
15 See the website of the Secretariat for Cooperation between China and CEECs, http://www.china-
ceec.org/eng/belgrade.htm.
16 See “Opinion Piece by Prime Minister of China Li Keqiang”, in Belgrade Meeting Brochure, 2014, 
p. 5, http://www.china-ceec-summit.gov.rs/doc/CHINA%20SEE%20SUMMIT%20Belgrade%20
Meeting%20brochure%202014.pdf.
17 Alex Domanski, “China signs second-biggest swap line with ECB”, in Reuters, 10 October 2013, 
http://reut.rs/1fllvoe.
18 For more details on Renminbi trading hubs and the Renminbi Internationalisation Index (RII) 
– a figure that describes the Renminbi’s usage proportion in global trade – see the latest report by 
Standard Chartered Global Research authored by Kelvin Lau et al., Offshore Renminbi – Anchoring 
Confidence, 7 October 2015, https://www.sc.com/en/resources/global-en/pdf/Research/2015/RGI-
Oct-2015.pdf.
19 Stefan Riecher and Jeff Black, “ECB Said to Weigh First Step to Buying Yuan for Reserves”, in 
Bloomberg Business, 10 October 2014, http://bloom.bg/1Lq4p7W. See also Nicola Casarini, “China’s 
Financial Footprint in Europe”, in ISN-Security Watch, 13 March 2015, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/
Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=188943.
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costs.
Beijing also wants to make the yuan one of the main currencies for global trade, 
putting limits on the role of the dollar in the international monetary system. To this 
end, the PBOC has signed bilateral currency swap agreements worth more than 3 
trillion yuan (500 billion dollars) with more than 35 central banks and monetary 
authorities in the last years. Today, the renminbi is the world’s second most used 
trade finance currency and the fourth most used currency for global payments, 
though its share by value remains low – just 2.8 percent in August according to 
Swift and the Financial Times.20 On 8 October 2015, Beijing launched a cross-border 
renminbi payments system in a further drive to boost the international use of its 
currency.21
The PBOC has designated a number of yuan clearing banks, known as RMB Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investors (RQFII), the majority of which are in Europe, in 
places like London, Frankfurt, Paris, Luxemburg, Prague and Zurich. During the 
state visit of Xi Jinping to the United Kingdom in October 2015, China chose 
London to issue its first overseas renminbi sovereign debt.22 It is very likely that 
other European financial capitals will issue Chinese treasury bonds in renminbi in 
the coming months, spurring a race among EU members to become an attractive 
place for renminbi trading and services.
Growing Sino-European monetary ties largely explain the decision by the UK 
followed promptly by Germany, France and Italy, to join as founding members 
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a China-led regional bank seen 
as a potential rival to the World Bank, despite US pressure to stay out. By joining 
the Chinese-initiated bank, Europe’s four largest economies have not only 
acknowledged Beijing’s emerging financial power, but also laid the ground for 
closer monetary connectivity with the country that could soon become the world’s 
largest economy. In an op-ed published by The Guardian in September 2015, George 
Osborne and Jim O’Neill, respectively the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer and the 
Commercial Secretary to the Treasury, made it clear that “the future prosperity 
of [the UK] depends on us strengthening our relationship with the world’s next 
superpower.”23 Yet, opening up Europe’s doors to the “next superpower” may also 
have some serious political implications.
20 Gabriel Wildau, “China takes big step in push for renminbi to rival dollar”, in Financial Times, 
9 October 2015, p. 3 (online as “China launch of renminbi payments system reflects Swift spying 
concerns”, 8 October 2015, http://on.ft.com/1ZeGa2t).
21 Ibid.
22 James Kynge and George Parker, “China set to choose London for its first overseas renminbi 
sovereign debt issue”, in Financial Times, 14 October 2015, p. 1 (online as “China poised to issue 
sovereign debt in renminbi in London”, 13 October 2015, http://on.ft.com/1ZzYWBI).
23 George Osborne and Jim O’Neill, “It’s in Britain’s interest to bond with China now”, in The 
Guardian, 19 September 2015, http://gu.com/p/4ch2d/stw. See also Liam Byrne, Turning to Face the 
East. How Britain Can Prosper in the Asian Century, London, Guardian Books, 2013.
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5. Implications for the EU
While there are undoubtedly great economic opportunities, China’s Belt and 
Road initiative – and its corollary of growing Sino-European monetary ties – also 
presents the EU with a major political challenge. There is the risk, in fact, that a 
scramble for Chinese money could further divide EU member states and make it 
difficult for Brussels to fashion a common position vis-à-vis Beijing. Furthermore, 
China’s economic penetration into Europe may lead to a populist backlash and the 
fate of the port of Piraeus could be the first of such cases.
Given the harsh conditions demanded by its creditors, Greece may have no 
alternative but to proceed with the Piraeus privatisation. The EU is keen to push 
the sale through while China is lobbying hard to win the tender. A kind of entente 
cordiale could emerge between Brussels and Beijing over the transaction, an 
understanding that could be replicated elsewhere in the cash-strapped periphery 
where the two sides share an interest in supporting infrastructure projects. Imagine, 
however, that if COSCO wins the Piraeus tender, the port will be entirely in Chinese 
hands. That prospect may sharpen the view of China as a political and commercial 
threat to EU member states, particularly in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, 
whose big container ports will face a tough new competitor.
Some European critics worry that the OBOR lacks transparency rules and that the 
opaque financing deals may threaten the competitiveness of European companies. 
China requires, in fact, that infrastructure works financed by its soft loans be 
carried out by Chinese companies, as in the case of the Hungaro-Serbian high-
speed railway or Terminal II of Piraeus. This raises the question of reciprocity. 
While Chinese companies find an open-door environment in Europe, it is quite 
difficult – if not impossible – for a European company to succeed in winning a 
contract to build infrastructure projects in mainland China.
The question of reciprocity is closely linked to what may be the thorniest issue 
in Sino-European relations: the market economy status (MES). A provision in 
China’s WTO accession agreement that allows other countries to treat it as a non-
market economy will expire in December 2016,24 potentially requiring the EU 
to begin drafting new trade legislation by the end of this year. Granting Beijing 
MES would make it easier for Chinese companies targeted in WTO anti-dumping 
cases to defend themselves. While Beijing argues that MES should be extended 
automatically in December 2016 under the terms of its WTO accession agreement, 
some EU member states maintain that the agreement instead requires Chinese 
exporters to prove first that they do not benefit from government subsidies and 
currency policy.
24 Roberto Bendini and Barbara Barone, Trade and economic relations with China 2015, Brussels, 
European Parliament, June 2015, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.
html?reference=EXPO_IDA%282015%29549062.
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There are growing concerns in Europe that through the Belt and Road initiative, 
China seeks to tackle industrial overcapacity at home by dumping or exporting 
goods priced below production costs, risking thus to bring entire industrial lines 
across Europe to their knees. If the EU were to designate China as a “market 
economy,” it would then be impossible for Brussels to strike back against unfair 
export practices with countervailing tariffs. There is growing resistance in Europe 
from manufacturing industries that see themselves as vulnerable, and the EU – 
together with the US – may be tempted to resist granting China “market economy 
status.”
Finally, closer Sino-European ties may strain relations with the US. Beijing has 
traditionally looked at the euro as the only serious counterbalance to the dollar 
and, consequently, has come to support the eurozone politically while divesting 
away from the dollar and into the euro in earnest. Today, euro-denominated assets 
represent more than one-third of China’s total foreign currency reserves which are 
the world’s largest. Europe – and the United Kingdom in particular, but not only – 
is playing an important role in the internationalisation of the Chinese currency, a 
move that directly challenges the global status of the dollar. US policymakers are, 
therefore, watching closely to see whether the EU is able to strike a balance between 
the historic transatlantic bond and China’s pull on Europe.
Greater Sino-European connectivity will inevitably entail some economic and 
political costs for Europe – and the same could be said for China. Yet, the One 
Belt, One Road remains, ultimately, a great opportunity for a continent that is 
still struggling to recover from the crisis. Beijing has faith in Europe’s recovery, 
as demonstrated by the multibillion euro investment commitment from China to 
Juncker’s newly created European Fund.
What is urgently needed in Europe is a comprehensive response to the Belt and 
Road initiative. The focus should not be limited to economy and trade, but also 
include political and security issues. For instance, the OBOR plans to go through 
the same routes used by the refugees fleeing the Syrian conflict and other war-torn 
societies. Given the significant funds already committed to infrastructural projects 
in Southeast Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean, the stability of these regions 
should be a matter of priority for China as well. The OBOR should thus compel 
Brussels and Beijing to seek ways to join forces and contribute to bringing stability 
and prosperity to Europe’s neighbourhood without relinquishing, however, those 
norms and practices that Europe has long fostered. Should the two succeed in 
creating effective mechanisms and ad hoc projects to address some of the root 
causes of the refugee crisis, this would help foster a positive image of China – and 
contribute to mitigating the costs of the Belt and Road initiative for some sectors of 
the European economy.
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